The Effects of Jury Ignorance about Damage Caps:  The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act by Hollander-Blumoff, Rebecca & Bodie, Matthew T.
THE EFFECTS OF JURY IGNORANCE ABOUT DAMAGE 
CAPS: THE CASE OF THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff† & Matthew T. Bodie‡
INTRODUCTION
The way that juries determine damages has always been a 
mystery worth investigating.1 Particularly intriguing are the 
deliberations that lead to million or even billion dollar verdicts.2  The 
awe-inspiring breadth of these verdicts – even if they are short-lived –
has provoked an independent political movement to curb their excesses.3
Yet simultaneous with this concern over the runaway jury is a 
fundamental desire to protect the integrity of the jury process and 
maintain respect for the jury’s function and decisions.  The concurrent 
desires to exalt and to rein in the jury come face-to-face in laws aimed to
cap the damages that a jury can award in a civil case.  Damage cap 
statutes expressly limit the power of the jury to provide monetary relief 
to plaintiffs.4  However, some statutes, case law, and commentators 
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1 See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us 
About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
2 See, e.g., Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 
33534572 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000) (jury verdict awarding $145 billion in punitive 
damages), rev’d sub nom. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So.2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003).
3 See Terry Carter, It’s B-a-a-a-ck: With Republicans in Charge, Will Tort Reform 
Finally Have Its Day?, 46 ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT 3, 3 (December 6, 2002) (“Most 
talked about [potential Congressional tort reforms] are legislative proposals concerning 
asbestos litigation, medical malpractice liability, class action venues and perhaps some 
limitations on punitive damages.”).
4 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2000).  For a discussion of the reforms enacted 
by roughly sixty percent of states in 1986, see Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort
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suggest that informing the jury of the caps threatens the integrity of the 
jury decision-making process.5 The 1991 Civil Rights Act offers one 
such statutory example of protecting defendants from more expensive 
jury awards while attempting to maintain the “integrity” of these awards.
Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs bringing federal 
employment discrimination claims were entitled only to the most basic 
relief: reinstatement and back wages, reduced by interim earnings that 
had or should have been earned.6  This equitable relief was awarded by 
judges, rather than juries; plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial.7  The 
1991 Act changed all this, and in so doing has been recognized as a 
watershed moment in employment discrimination litigation.8  Now, 
either party may demand a trial by jury.9  And instead of simply seeking 
reinstatement and back pay, plaintiffs can demand compensatory 
damages for future pecuniary losses, as well as emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary losses.10  Additionally, if the 
defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference, the plaintiff may 
recover punitive damages.11  The new damages radically improved the 
potential relief available to federal employment discrimination plaintiffs, 
opening up the possibility for much larger judgments.
These pro-plaintiff changes were mitigated somewhat by caps on 
the punitive and compensatory damages.12  These caps are scaled 
according to the size of the defendant employer and are unrelated to the 
severity of the offense.13  Such caps are not unique; a number of other 
statutes expressly limit the recovery of damages to a set or formulated 
Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on 
Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628 (1988).
5 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2); Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don't Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: The 
Merits of Non-Disclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470 (1999).
6
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
7 Id. at §2000e-5(f)(4).
8 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. 
L. REV. 277, 279 (noting that “the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
attracted to the practice of employment law a new generation of lawyers, who approach 
employment litigation like personal injury cases”).
9
 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (2000).
10 Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
11 Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
12 Id, § 1981a(b)(3).
13
 Combined compensatory and punitive damages cannot exceed $50,000 if the 
employer has 100 or fewer employees, $100,000 for employers with 100 to 200 
employees, $200,000 for employers with 200 to 500 employees, and $300,000 for 
employers with more than 500 employees.  See id.  These numbers do not, however, 
include any back pay that the jury awards.
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maximum.14  Caps are part of an overall movement to reform the tort 
system, typically enacted by those who believe that the civil legal system 
unfairly burdens society by paying out huge damage awards.15
In an interesting twist, Congress also expressly required that "the 
court shall not inform the jury of the limitations [on damages]."16 Thus, 
when called upon to measure damages in federal employment 
discrimination cases, juries are expected to make their calculations 
without knowing the ultimate limit that the caps enforce.  The cap non-
disclosure clause has been touted as a method of maintaining the 
"integrity" of jury damages calculations: if informed of the caps, jurors 
could purposely attempt to evade them or might be unconsciously biased 
by the cap number.17 A variety of others, including courts and 
commentators, have suggested that non-disclosure of damage caps, more 
generally, should be the rule whenever a damage cap exists.18
This effort to preserve a jury's decision-making integrity by not 
discussing the caps, however, forces courts and attorneys to conceal the 
true state of the law and may exact a toll on public confidence in the 
justice system.  This paper explores the potential broad effects on the 
jury system of the failure to disclose damage caps.  In order to better 
understand the context of disclosure versus non-disclosure, we first 
examine the psychological effects that knowledge as opposed to 
ignorance of the caps could have on jury decision-making processes and 
damage awards.  We then turn to an examination of the potential effects
that ignorance of the caps may have on perceptions of the legal process.  
Ultimately, we conclude that jurors should be informed of the caps, both 
to retain public confidence in the justice system and to give jurors 
guidance in making the proper damages determination.
14 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (2004); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. § 41.008 (Vernon 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2004).
15
 Commentators suggest that such tort damage awards pass along great costs to 
ordinary citizens.  For example, Albert Yoon suggests that medical malpractice 
produces an astronomical amount of costs – between $17 and $29 billion per year.  
Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical 
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 27 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199, 200 (2001).
16 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2).
17
 Kang, supra note MK1, at 470.
18 See id. at 478-79; see also American College of Trial Lawyers Committee on 
Special Problems in the Administration of Justice, Report on Punitive Damages 15 
(1989), available at: http://www.actl.com/PDFs/ReportOnPunitiveDamages.pdf;
Thomas v. Sanford, 663 S.W.2d 932 935 (Ark. 1984); State v. Bouras, 423 N.E,2d 741, 
744 (Ind. App. 1981).  But see Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1040 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(finding no abuse of discretion in informing jurors about a Massachusetts state cap); 
Vendrell v. School District, 360 P.2d 282, 292 (Or. 1961) (holding that jury must be 
informed of state statutory limit on recovery against school district).
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In Part I, we discuss the legislative history and judicial 
interpretation of the cap non-disclosure clause, with an eye toward the 
purpose behind the clause.  In Part II, we discuss the potential effects of 
disclosure and non-disclosure of the cap on jury damage awards in light 
of psychological models of decision-making.  In Part III, we discuss 
potential effects of the concealed cap on perceptions of the justice 
system, in particular examining procedural justice effects.  Finally, in 
Part IV, we argue for a system of disclosure that would use the caps to 
guide jurors to the correct assessment of compensatory and punitive 
damages.
I
NON-DISCLOSURE OF THE CAPS: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The 1991 Civil Rights Act is a many-faceted piece of legislation, 
dealing with issues such as disparate impact claims,19 the “business 
necessity” defense,20 and the right to a jury trial.21  The Act followed in 
the wake of several Supreme Court decisions which had curtailed or 
eliminated the rights and remedies available to victims of employment 
discrimination.22 One of Congress’s primary goals was to reverse these 
decisions directly by rewriting the civil rights statutes.23  However, an 
additional purpose cited by the Act was to “provide appropriate remedies 
for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the 
workplace.”24  The Act did this by allowing federal employment 
discrimination plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages 
for the first time.25  Punitive damages were only allowed when the 
plaintiff demonstrated that the employer had engaged in the 
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
20 See id.  § 20003-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
21 Id. § 1981a(c)(1).
22
 Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis 
of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 
924 (1993).
23 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, § 3.  For example, the Act 
specifically restores the definitions of such statutory terms as “business necessity” and 
“job related” to the Court’s definitions as they existed prior to the decision in Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  105 Stat. 1071, § 3(2); see also id. § 
3(4) (noting that another purpose is “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide 
adequate protection to victims of discrimination”).
24 Id. § 3(1).
25
 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000) (providing that “the complaining party may 
recover compensatory and punitive damages”).
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discriminatory practice “with malice or reckless indifference” to the 
plaintiff’s civil rights.26  In addition, the Act placed a limit on total 
compensatory and punitive damages each plaintiff could receive.27  The 
actual damage cap was based on the number of employees working for 
the employer; the cap began at $50,000 for employers with less than 101 
employees, and rose to $300,000 for employers with more than 500 
employees.28  However, the Act specified that if the case was tried before 
a jury (a new possibility created by the Act itself), and the plaintiff 
sought compensatory or punitive damages, “the court shall not inform 
the jury of the limitations described [above].”29
In order to dissect the purpose of this non-disclosure provision, 
we begin below by discussing the legislative intent as manifested in the 
legislative history of the provision.  We then turn to how courts have 
interpreted the provision, including its secondary effects.
A. Legislative History: Lost in the Shuffle
Like prior civil rights statutes, the 1991 Civil Rights Act was 
passed only after taking a circuitous and controversial path.30   As noted 
above, the 1988 Supreme Court term saw a number of controversial 
decisions which cut back on the protections provided by federal 
employment discrimination law, particularly Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.  In response to these decisions, the United States House of 
Representatives approved H.R. 4000, entitled the Civil Rights Act of 
1990.  The bill provided for substantial amendments of the federal law of 
employment discrimination, including compensatory and punitive 
damages for victims of intentional discrimination.31  During 
congressional debate, the bill received criticism for its uncapped 
damages provisions.32  An identical bill was proposed in the Senate and 
26 Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
27 Id. § 1981a(b)(3).  The Supreme Court has determined that “front pay” – namely, 
money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and 
reinstatement (or in lieu of reinstatement) – is not considered compensatory damages 
and is thus not covered by the cap.  Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 
843, 852 (2001).
28
 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  The Act counted employees as those having worked 
“in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”  Id.
29 Id. § 1981a(c)(2).
30 See Nicole L. Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Comparative 
Procedural History of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J.
1201, 1203 (1995) (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6810-13 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990)).
31
 H.R. Res. 4000 § 8 (101st Cong. 1990).
32 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 71 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 757 ("You can show people all the studies that reveal that punitive 
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was reported favorably out of committee.33  However, the bill was later
amended to add a $150,000 cap to compensatory and punitive 
damages.34  The House and Senate passed the bill as amended, but 
President Bush vetoed it.35  An attempt to override the veto failed by one 
vote in the Senate.36
The House bill was resubmitted with minor changes in 1991 as 
H.R. 1, the "Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act."37
According to the House Report, one of the bill’s two primary purposes of 
the bill was "to strengthen existing protections and remedies available 
under federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and 
adequate compensation for victims of discrimination."38  Noting that 
compensatory and punitive damages were available under 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 for those who injured by intentional race discrimination, the report 
noted that a "serious gap" existed for victims of intentional 
discrimination on the basis of sex or religion.39  As did the 1990 bill, 
H.R. 1 provided for uncapped compensatory and punitive damages.40
The House Report dismissed concerns about excessive verdicts by noting 
that “juries are fully capable of determining whether an award of 
damages is appropriate and if so, how large it must be to compensate the 
plaintiff adequately and to deter future repetition of the prohibited 
conduct.”41  The minority report, however, feared that uncapped 
damages would lead to “a litigation generating machine” with “huge 
awards” in the millions of dollars.42
damage awards in the past have not been for astronomical amounts ... But I can tell you 
that it is small comfort if you are on the receiving end of a lawsuit where the allegation 
is for say $3 or $4 million in punitive damages. That is your exposure. When somebody 
files a lawsuit against you and they say, 'I am entitled to $10,000 in compensatory 
damages and $5 million in punitive damages,' it will ruin your whole night's sleep." 
(quoting Sen. Dale Bumpers)).
33
 S. 2104 (101st Cong. 1990); S. Rep. No. 101-315 (1990).
34 See Gueron, supra note NG1, at 1203 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6810-13 (daily 
ed. Aug. 2, 1990)).
35 See Gueron, supra note NG1, at 1203; Roger Clegg, An Introduction: A Brief 
Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1994).
36 See Gueron, supra note NG1, at 1203; Clegg, supra note RC1, at 1465.
37 See H.R. 1 (102d Cong. January 3, 1991).
38
 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) 1 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
694.  The other purpose was to "respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by 
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions." 
Id.  
39 Id. at 24, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 717.
40 See H.R. 1 § 206 (102d Cong. January 3, 1991).
41
 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (I) 72 (April 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
610.  
42
 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) 143, 153 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991 
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H.R. 1 was amended in June 1991 to include a cap on punitive 
damages, but compensatory damages remained uncapped.43  The House 
approved the bill as amended, but the Senate never voted on the House 
bill.  Instead, the Senate passed its own version, which included both the 
caps and the non-disclosure requirement.  The House eventually 
approved the Senate version, which President Bush signed into law. At 
the signing, the President said the following about the caps contained in 
the bill:
Another important source of the controversy that delayed 
enactment of this legislation was a proposal to authorize jury 
trials and punitive damages in cases arising under Title VII.  S. 
1745 adopts a compromise under which 'caps' have been placed 
on the amount that juries may award in such cases.  The 
adoption of these limits on jury awards sets an important 
precedent, and I hope to see this model followed as part of an 
initiative to reform the Nation's tort system.44
Soon after the 1991 Civil Rights Act was signed into law, the "Equal 
Remedies Act of 1991" was proposed in the Senate.45  The bill would 
have removed the damage caps and the non-disclosure provision from 
the code.46  However, it failed to pass.47
U.S.C.C.A.N. 672, 682.  
43
 137 Cong. Rec. H3922, H3924 (June 5, 1991).  The cap limited punitive 
damages to $150,000 or the sum of compensatory and equitable relief awarded 
(whichever was greater).
44
 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (Nov. 21, 1991).
45
 S. 2062 (102d Cong. Nov. 26, 1991).
46
 The committee report on the bill argued that the removal of the caps was 
necessary to insure that women, religious minorities, and people with disabilities had 
the same access to damages as racial and ethnic minorities.  S. Rep. No. 102-286, at 5 
(1992) ("Congress has created a system which values injuries suffered by women, 
people with disabilities, and certain religious minorities less than the same injuries 
suffered by racial or ethnic minorities.").  According to the report, Congress accepted 
the restrictions on damages "[i]n the interest of securing prompt passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, including the portion guaranteeing the right to damages," and "left 
to 1992 the task of providing full, fair, and equal remedies for victims of 
discrimination."  Id. at 3.  The committee minority, however, noted that the caps were 
"part of the compromise on last year's civil rights legislation approved overwhelmingly 
by the House of Representatives and the Senate.”  Id. at 20.  The minority argued that 
capped damages represented "a significant expansion of the remedies" provided under 
Title VII, and "unrestricted damages will lead to a litigation explosion [and will] result 
in excessive damage awards that may be harmful to the financial health of the firm."  
Id. at 21.
47
 Two bills in the current Congress propose to eliminate the caps on compensatory 
and punitive damages.  See S. 2088 § 532 (108th Cong. Feb. 12, 2004); H.R. 3809 § 532 
8 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew Bodie
The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act contains little 
specific discussion of the non-disclosure requirement.  One reason may 
be that the House Report was prepared for a bill that did not have 
statutory damage caps, let alone a non-disclosure provision.48  However, 
Senator John Danforth, one of the Senate bill's co-sponsors and reputedly 
the driving force behind the final compromise bill,49 did provide this 
discussion on jury discretion and knowledge of the caps:
Judges currently serve as an adequate check on the discretion 
of juries to award damages.  Consistent with the Seventh 
Amendment, they can and do reduce awards which are 
excessive in light of defendant's discriminatory conduct or a 
plaintiff's resulting loss.
In addition, the bill specifically provides that the jury shall not 
be informed of the existence or amount of the caps on damage 
awards.  Thus, no pressure, upward or downward, will be 
exerted on the amount of jury awards by the existence of the 
statutory limitations.50
The effects of the cap, according to Senator Danforth, thus appear to be 
the potential for “pressure” to move damages “upward or downward” 
from where they would have been without disclosure of the cap.  Senator 
Danforth does not explain why this pressure is to be avoided, or whether 
damages are more likely to be moved upward or downward if the caps 
were to be revealed.
There appears to have been little investigation by Congress into 
the potential effects that hiding the caps would have, not only on jury 
awards but also on jurors, judges, and attorneys.  While the wisdom of 
cap non-disclosure was lost in the shuffle of legislative compromise, 
courts have been left to determine the scope and legal effect of the non-
disclosure provision.
B. Judicial Interpretation: Integrity vs. Reallocation
While other provisions of the 1991 Act have received extensive 
judicial exegesis, the cap non-disclosure provision has gotten only 
limited attention.  The non-disclosure provision has arisen in two 
(108th Cong. Feb. 11, 2004).
48 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (I) 64-65 (April 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 602-03. 
49 See Clegg, supra note RC1, at 1469-70.
50
 137 Cong. Rec. S15484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Danforth).
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contexts, one which involves the provision directly and the other which 
involves an indirect consequence of the provision.  These contexts are 
considered below.
1. Direct context: Who can tell the jury what? 
The text of the § 1981a non-disclosure provision states that “the 
court shall not inform the jury” about the statutory cap.51  Read literally, 
the provision would seem to prohibit only judges from explaining or 
discussing the damages limitations. In Sasaki v. Class,52 however, the 
Fourth Circuit held that attorneys were also prohibited from disclosing 
the cap, or its effects, to jurors.  The plaintiff in Sasaki brought suit 
against the employer alleging sexual harassment under Title VII as well 
as assault and battery under state tort law.53  During his closing 
argument, plaintiff's counsel indicated to the jury that it could award 
plaintiff "up to $50,000" in compensatory damages on the sexual 
harassment claim, and "up to $500,000" on the state tort claim.54  While 
counsel did not explicitly inform the jury about the caps, he did contrast 
the two different claims, and he noted that on the state law "the law is 
generous."55  Ultimately, the jury awarded plaintiff $61,250 in damages 
on the sexual harassment claim56 and $150,000 on the state law claim.57
The Fourth Circuit determined that counsel had violated 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) by revealing the existence of the caps to the jury.58
The court acknowledged that the statute literally only prohibits the 
"court" from informing the jury about the caps.59  However, it held that 
"Congress clearly intended this restriction to prohibit anyone from 
bringing the caps to the jury's attention."60  In discussing the purpose of 
the provision, the court cited Senator Danforth's argument that the non-
disclosure clause would eliminate the potential for "pressure, upward or 
downward," on damages exerted by the caps.61  Noting that the caps 
themselves were "enacted in apparent response to a concern about 
51
 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (2000).
52
 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996).
53 Id. at 235.
54 Id. at 235-36.
55 Id. at 236.
56
 This amount fell below the cap, as plaintiff was awarded $11,250 in back pay, 
which is not counted against the cap.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 236.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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runaway verdicts," the court posited that the non-disclosure clause was 
enacted "because 'legislators would likely fear that juries would award 
the maximum or would otherwise adjust their awards if told of the 
statutory limit.'"62  The court found strong reason to believe that the jury 
had, in fact, tailored its damages verdict to circumvent the cap.  
Although the acts covered by the state tort claims (unwanted touching) 
were included within the sexual harassment claim, the jury awarded 
almost three times the damages for that claim.  Moreover, the jury 
adhered to plaintiff’s counsel's suggested damages on the harassment 
claim, not going above counsel's suggested maximum.  The court found 
that the jury "appears to have faithfully followed [plaintiff's] counsel's 
directions" and "almost undoubtedly adjusted its award to account for the 
federal cap."63  According to the court, "[t]he jury here likely reacted in 
precisely the manner that Congress specifically feared, and which it 
attempted to preclude through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a."64
Finding that counsel's statement was not harmless error, the court 
remanded for a new trial on damages.65
In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit agreed with Sasaki's 
conclusion that the cap non-disclosure clause extends to counsel as well 
as the courts.66  However, the court found that counsel's reference was 
harmless, because there was "no indication it had any effect on the jury's 
award."67  The jury awarded $300,000 in punitive damages, the statutory 
maximum, on plaintiff's gender discrimination claim – her only claim.  
The court reasoned that the jury's knowledge of the caps did not change 
its award:
From a practical standpoint, if the jury felt [defendant's] 
conduct warranted less than $300,000 in punitive damages, 
there is no reason to believe the mention of the limit on 
punitive damages would have caused the jury to increase the 
award.  If the jury believed that [defendant's] conduct 
warranted more than $300,000, its knowledge of the cap did 
nothing more than limit the jury's award to the lesser amount, 
62 Id. at 237 (quoting Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension 
Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 347 n.8 (1995)).
63 Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 243.
66 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. EMC Corp., 205 F.3d 1339 (Table), 
2000 WL 191819 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000).  Interestingly, the reference to the caps was 
made by an attorney for the EEOC.  See id. at *8 (noting that EEOC counsel said to the 
jury that $300,000 was "the most we can ask for" and "[i]f we could, we would ask for 
a lot more").
67 Id. at *9.
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which the district court would have done in any event had the 
jury returned a larger verdict.68
The dissenting judge disagreed, however:
An inescapable inherent risk exists that the jurors in this case 
experienced pressure to award $300,000 in punitive damages, 
instead of a lesser sum, in response to a misconceived 
perception that Congress had foreordained that an employer of 
[defendant's] size which satisfied the requisites for punitive 
liability . . . should be punished in the amount of $300,000.69
As these divergent opinions shows, judges have intuitive – and 
conflicting – notions about the effects that knowledge of the caps may 
have, ranging from (1) the caps will have no effect to (2) jurors will 
misunderstand the caps to (3) jurors will understand and circumvent the 
caps.
Although courts have not agreed on the likely effects of the non-
disclosure clause, there is agreement that the statutory caps do not affect 
the amount of damages that a plaintiff may request from the jury, in part 
because of the non-disclosure provision.  In a number of cases, 
defendants argued that plaintiffs’ prayers for relief should be struck by 
the court because these prayers exceeded the statutorily-provided 
damage limitations.70  However, courts have rejected this argument on 
the basis on the non-disclosure provision.  By forcing plaintiffs to limit 
their claims to the statutory cap, a court “would in effect inform the jury 
of the damage caps.”71  One court also suggested that forcing a plaintiff 
to request only the capped amount would hinder the plaintiff’s ability to 
demonstrate “the relative importance of her different damages claims,” 
thereby impairing the plaintiff’s credibility.72  Instead, the courts have 
68 Id.  The court also noted that since the employer had failed to object at trial when 
the statutory limit was mentioned, the employer had the burden of showing that 
counsel’s conduct was “outrageous” or “egregious.”  Id. at *8.
69 Id. at *15 (Krupansky, J. dissenting).
70 See, e.g., Johnson v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 926 F. Supp. 874, 876 (E.D. 
Minn. 1996); Beam v. Concord Hospitality, Inc., 1996 WL 455020, at *5 (D. Kan. July 
8, 1996); Solomon v. Godwin & Carlton, P.C., 898 F. Supp. 415, 416 (N.D. Tex. 1995); 
Haltek v. Village of Park Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
71 Haltek, 864 F. Supp. at 807; see also Johnson, 926 F. Supp. at 876; Beam, 1996 
WL 455020 at *6; Solomon, 898 F. Supp. at 417.  It is unclear whether these courts 
were suggesting that (1) plaintiffs would be entitled to explain their damages award, 
thereby exposing the damage cap, or (2) jurors would intuit the presence of a cap by the 
clipped nature of plaintiff’s prayer for relief.
72 Beam, 1996 WL 455020 at *6.
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stated that the proper procedure is to allow the plaintiff to request an 
unlimited amount and then reduce the actual damages awarded if they 
rise above the cap.73
2.  Indirect effects: How should damages be apportioned between federal 
and state claims?
Federal antidiscrimination protections such as Title VII are not 
the only employment discrimination statutes available to employees.  
States and localities also provide statutory antidiscrimination protections, 
and these protections are not preempted by the federal provisions.74
States are even permitted to go beyond the federal provisions in their 
coverage or relief.75  These provisions may seem superfluous if a 
plaintiff is protected by a federal statute, but many of these statutes 
provide for uncapped compensatory and/or punitive damages.76  Because 
of this potential difference, a plaintiff may be entitled to significantly 
lower relief under the federal statute than she is entitled to under the state 
or local statute.  
Given the potential for different relief for the same underlying 
offense, judges and juries must grapple with how to apportion relief 
between the capped federal statute and an uncapped state statute.  The 
Sasaki case provides an illustration of this.  In Sasaki, the plaintiff 
brought a federal claim (capped at $50,000) and a state tort claim 
(capped at $500,000) based on the same underlying sexual harassment.77
The plaintiff’s attorney suggested to the jury that it award the maximum 
amount under the federal claim, and then provide for further damages 
under the state claim.78  And as the court noted, the jury appears to have 
followed these instructions, awarding the statutory maximum on the 
federal claim and $215,000 on the state claim.79   The Sasaki court 
believed that the non-disclosure provision was designed to prevent such 
73 See Johnson, 926 F. Supp. at 876; Solomon, 898 F. Supp. at 417; Haltek, 864 F. 
Supp. at 807.
74 See Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law 
Preemption, 13 LAB. LAW. 429, 440-41 (1998).
75 See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 
(1987).
76
 For a table outlining the availability of punitive damages in state employment 
discrimination statutes, see Stacy A. Hickox, Reduction of Punitive Damages for 
Employment Discrimination: Are Courts Ignoring our Juries?, 54 MERCER L. REV.
1081, 1123-32 (2003).
77
 Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232, 235-36 (4th Cir. 1996).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 235.
DAMAGE CAPS 13
award structuring.80  According to the court, such award shifting was 
what “Congress specifically feared” about cap awareness and thus why 
Congress had included the non-disclosure provisions.81
The D.C. Circuit does not agree.  In Martini v. Federal National 
Mortgage Association,82 plaintiff brought harassment and retaliation 
claims under both Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act.  The district 
court instructed the jury to award damages not only based on type of 
claim (i.e., harassment or retaliation), but also based on statutory basis 
(federal or local law).  The jury awarded a total of nearly $7 million in 
damages, including $3 million in punitive damages under the Title VII 
claims and almost $2 million in compensatory and punitive on the D.C. 
Human Rights claims.83  The district court then applied the $300,000 cap 
to the Title VII damages.  The D.C. Circuit, however, held that the 
district court should have reallocated the excess Title VII damages to the 
plaintiff's recovery under the D.C. Human Rights Act.  Noting that the 
district court had provided the same instructions for the federal and local 
claims, the court held that the jury had no legal basis for distinguishing 
between the statutes.  Thus, for example, if the jury had awarded $2 
million in punitives under the plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim and $1 
million in punitives under the D.C. Human Rights retaliation claim, "the 
most sensible inference is that the jury sought to impose a total of $3 
million in punitive damages against [defendant] for retaliation."84  Thus, 
while only $300,000 of those damages could be awarded under Title VII, 
the district court should have reallocated the other $1.7 million to the 
local claim.  The court stated: "Were we not to treat damages under 
federal and local law as fungible where the standards of liability are the 
same, we would effectively limit the local jurisdiction's prerogative to 
provide greater remedies for employment discrimination than those 
Congress has afforded under Title VII."85
Most courts have held that district courts have discretion to 
reallocate a total damages award between state and federal claims.86
80 Id. at 237.
81 Id.
82
 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
83 Id. at 1339.
84 Id. at 1349.
85 Id. at 1349-50.  The court held that "[s]uch a result would violate Title VII's 
express terms" that the Act was not intended to relieve defendants of liability under 
state law.  Id. at 1350.
86 See Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 510 (9th Cir. 
2000); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997); Barrios v. 
Kody Marine, Inc., 2000 WL 775067, at *4 (E.D. La. June 14, 2000); Luciano v. Olsten 
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Courts have been willing to shuffle the monetary awards between claims 
in order to maximize the plaintiff’s recovery, particularly if the jury has 
jointly allocated the damages to the state and federal claims.  For 
example, in Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, Inc.,87
the plaintiff had brought both Title VII claims and claims under the 
Washington State Law Against Discrimination.88  The jury found for the 
plaintiff, awarding her backpay as well as $1 million in compensatory 
damages and $8.6 million in punitive damages.  The district court 
allocated all of the $1 million compensatory damages to the state claim, 
and all of the punitive damages to federal claim.89  This allocation 
maximized plaintiff’s recovery, as under state law compensatory 
damages were uncapped, but punitive damages were not permitted.90
The Ninth Circuit upheld this allocation.  The court noted: “An 
allocation that would serve to reduce lawfully awarded damages would 
fail to respect the jury’s verdict and conflict with the purpose and intent 
of one or both statutes.”91
Courts thus appear to have two distinct viewpoints on the 1991 
Civil Rights Act damage caps and their non-disclosure to the jury.  One
perspective prizes the jurors’ ignorance of the caps as a way of insuring 
that the jury does its work without an understanding of the ultimate 
outcome.  If jurors were told of the cap, this perspective fears, they 
would engage in gamesmanship with any non-capped damages and 
circumvent the purpose of the caps.  The other perspective views the 
caps as a procedural rule that plays only a limited role within the entire 
process.  Judges are permitted to reallocate jurors’ damage awards in an 
effort to give the greatest possible recovery to the plaintiff.  It seems 
clear that under this perspective there would be little problem with 
informing jurors about the caps, if doing so were permitted.  Informing 
the jurors would obviate the need for any post hoc reallocation, as the 
Corp., 912 F. Supp., 663, 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d on other grounds, 110 F.3d 210 
(2d Cir. 1997); Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 851 (Iowa 
2001).  But see Oliver v. Cole Gift Centers, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113 (D. Conn. 
2000) (applying federal cap to total recovery under federal and state law, but also 
noting that plaintiff was “adequately compensated” by the capped amount).
87
 212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000).
88 Id. at 503.
89 Id. at 509-10.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 510.  See also Barrios, 2000 WL 775067 at *4 (arguing that when the jury 
fails to allocate awards between claims, “it is most consistent with the intent of the jury 
to permit Plaintiff to recover the maximum amount possible”); Channon, 629 N.W.2d 
at 851 (holding that limiting damages to the federal cap amount “effectively limits 
[Iowa’s] prerogative to provide greater remedies under our civil rights statute than those 
available under Title VII”).
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jurors would be able to do this themselves.  However, neither perspective 
accounts for the possibility that knowledge of the caps will affect the 
jurors’ calculations in ways other than simple reallocation.  We 
undertake an examination of these effects below.
II
EFFECTS OF CAPS ON JUROR DAMAGE DETERMINATIONS
From the sole comment in the legislative history about the 
rationale for non-disclosure of the damage caps, it seems that the goal of 
non-disclosure is to preserve the status quo – the integrity – of jury 
deliberations.  The non-disclosure prevents pressure, “upward or 
downward,” even while exerting control on the jury's ability to impose a 
verdict above the cap amount.  So, while the cap clearly signals an effort 
to lower federal employment discrimination verdicts, the non-disclosure 
has no such obvious directional purpose behind it.  
By keeping juries ignorant of damage caps, legislators imply that 
juries will be unable to compensate adequately for the effects of knowing 
about the caps and will take the caps into account in making their 
damages awards.  In making this assumption, legislators appear to be 
cognizant of the jurors as human decision-makers who may not always 
follow a rational-actor model.  Psychologists and others who study 
decision-making have relied on both normative and descriptive models 
to explain and envision the decision-making process; an examination of 
decision-making models indicate that juries may well be influenced by 
knowledge of the damage caps.   
Normative models of decision-making show how the fully 
rational decision-maker would optimally make decisions based on a 
certain set of rational assumptions.  The classic normative analysis is 
“expected utility theory” – that is, rational decision makers will seek to 
maximize their expected utility.92  In economic terms, the utility of each 
possible outcome is calculated and then weighted by its probability.  
Dominance is a primary principle of rational behavior that governs 
decision-making under expected utility:  simply put, if one option, choice 
A, has more utility (e.g., is better) than another option, choice B, a 
decision-maker will prefer and thus select choice A over choice B.93
Another principle, invariance, refers to the idea that varying descriptions 
of a choice should not impact which choice is made.94  Whether one 
92 SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 80-83 
(1993).
93 Id. at 81.
94 Id. at 82.
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describes a choice in terms of awarding money to a plaintiff or taking it 
from defendant, for instance, should not impact the decision maker, if the 
monetary amounts are in fact identical in both alternatives.  
A jury composed of “rational actors” would use utility theory to 
determine the optimal damages award for a plaintiff.  Knowledge of a 
cap would not influence jurors’ assessments of appropriate damages, 
except to eliminate any choice involving damages higher than the cap.  
Take, for instance, a jury that does not know of a cap of $300,000 and 
rationally weighs damages awards of $50,000, $80,000, and $110,000. 
Using a utility theory approach, the jury might decide that $80,000 is the 
most appropriate figure.  With knowledge of the cap, this decision would 
not change, because the caps do not change the utility or permissibility
of the available choices; rather, it merely limits the available choices to a 
range that the jury already believes is appropriate. 
Consider, however, a jury that is deliberating between $400,000, 
$600,000 and $800,000.  Under a normative approach to decision-
making, the jury might arrive at $600,000.  With knowledge of a 
$300,000 cap, the jury will act rationally in awarding the maximum 
damages figure of $300,000, because it will account for the fact that its 
award would be higher but for the existence of the caps.95 Under a 
utility theory approach, knowledge of the caps will not change juries' 
assessments of damages awards, except that those awards that fall above 
the cap range will all be considered as equal to the cap and each other.  
Indeed, knowledge of the caps under this framework would only act to 
maximize the efficiency of a rationally-acting jury:  any debate or 
discussion about varying awards over the cap would be unnecessary.  
Presumably, then, since revealing the caps would make jury 
deliberations faster and easier for a jury governed by expected utility 
theory, Congress did not expect such a jury.  And, in fact, although 
normative principles have intuitive logical appeal, research has 
consistently shown that human decision-makers do deviate significantly 
from normative decision-making principles.  Descriptive decision-
making models, heuristics, and decision-making phenomena account for 
human patterns of behavior that are not explained by normative 
theories.96  An examination of these descriptive models, heuristics, and 
95 The court in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. EMC Corp. espoused 
this notion of rationality.  Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. EMC Corp., 205 
F.3d 1339 (Table), 2000 WL 191819, at *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000).  
96 Commentators have noted that there is a discrepancy between normative 
decision-making theory and actual jury practice.  See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. 
Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?  26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 625 (2002).  
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phenomena in light of knowledge of the caps shows how such 
knowledge might affect jury verdicts.  
As explained below, anchoring is perhaps the most robust and 
widely discussed psychological phenomenon that would come into play 
in jury damage deliberations.  It is not clear, however, that anchoring is 
the sole potential effect that revealing the caps would produce.  Below, 
we consider anchoring as well as several other decision-making 
paradigms that could potentially result in altering the jury’s damages 
award in light of knowledge of the caps.  An examination of these 
paradigms suggests that knowing of the caps could have both a
quantitative impact, affecting the ultimate numerical figure of the 
damage award, either upward or downward, and a qualitative impact, 
making a difference in how the jury arrives at its decision.
A.  Anchoring and Adjustment
Psychological research has marshaled strong evidence for the 
phenomena of anchoring and adjustment,97 in which the first number 
with which a decision-maker is presented has a demonstrable effect on 
that person's ultimate choice.  In essence, the first number heard becomes 
the place away from which any adjustment is made.  Anchoring effects 
are powerful, widespread, and have been found in a variety of contexts.  
The source of the anchoring first number need not even be tied to any 
rational source; indeed, the groundbreaking initial research on anchoring 
demonstrated that anchoring effects were robust even when subjects 
believed the first number to be randomly generated.98  In one example, 
researchers found that first asking whether the average temperature in 
San Francisco was above or below 558 degrees Fahrenheit resulted in 
higher estimates of the actual average temperature than those given by 
people who had not been asked the first question.99
In situations where jurors are advised by a judge of a damage 
cap, empirical research has shown that there is a strong anchoring effect.  
Juries make damage determinations by effectively moving "away from" 
the stated cap to the degree they believe appropriate.  Such anchoring 
effects have been found in studies testing the impact of punitive damage 
caps on mock jurors.  As Michael Saks and his colleagues have found, 
however, caps have differing effects on damage awards in low-severity, 
97
 We refer to the phenomenon of “anchoring and adjustment” simply as anchoring 
throughout this section.  
98
 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics 
and Biases, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1974).  
99 PLOUS, supra note SP1, at 146.
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medium-severity, and high-severity injury settings.100  In his juror 
simulation study, individuals were presented with one of three 
hypothetical injury scenarios and asked to make a damage award.  Some 
individuals were advised of the existence of a damage cap of $250,000 
“to provide [them] some guidance” in making their determinations; 
others were given no guidance or other forms of guidance, including 
average awards or ranges of most awards.  In the low-severity case 
scenario, the cap produced higher awards than either no information or 
other forms of guidance; in the medium-severity case, the cap produced a 
similar outcome to the no information condition, but a higher outcome 
than other forms of guidance yielded.  Finally, in the high-severity case, 
the cap produced a lower average damage award than the control.  Thus 
the cap acted to inflate damage awards for low-severity injuries, but to 
deflate damage awards for high-severity injuries.101
In a different juror simulation study, Jennifer Robbennolt and 
Christina Studebaker tested for anchoring effects by holding constant the 
severity of the injury and instead altering the amount of the damage 
cap.102  They found that mock jurors’ damage awards were influenced by 
knowledge of damage caps in both upwards and downward directions, 
depending on the size of the caps.  For example, in one experiment, the 
mean damage award made by individuals who were not given any 
information about a cap was approximately $5 million; those who were 
told of a $100,000 cap awarded an average of $83,100, while those who 
were told of a $50 million cap awarded an average of $9 million.  Thus 
high caps acted to inflate jury damage awards, while low caps acted to 
deflate damage awards.103
Empirical research, then, reveals that damage caps do have the 
potential to affect jury decision-making; however, it is not clear whether 
anchoring effects around the § 1981a damage cap would act largely to 
inflate or to depress damages awards.  For example, consider a jury that, 
if completely ignorant of the cap, might award $10,000,000 in damages 
for what it thinks is particularly egregious conduct.  If the jury learned of 
the cap, and thus anchored at $300,000, they might award that maximum 
or might adjust away to something less than $300,000, but their award 
could certainly not be driven up due to knowledge of the cap.  Thus, in 
100 Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1997).
101 Id. at 251-52.
102
 Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the 
Courtroom:  The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 
(1999). 
103 See also Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for 
Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991 (1995).
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the case of severe injury, anchoring effects could only act to deflate the 
damage award.  In contrast, consider a jury that would have otherwise 
awarded $20,000 in damages for minor injury.  If that jury were made 
aware of the $300,000 cap, anchoring effects would likely pull the award 
up higher than it would have been without the cap.104
Anchoring effects of a damage cap cannot, of course, be 
considered in a vacuum; empirical research has repeatedly shown that 
the plaintiff's demand for damages already acts as a psychological anchor 
for jurors.105  Thus, the “pure” jury deliberations that the non-disclosure 
provision was designed to protect are already “tainted” by what 
plaintiff106 has asked for, if plaintiff is permitted to ask for damages in 
the jurisdiction.107  Especially in light of the fact that there are no 
restrictions on numbers proposed by plaintiffs' attorneys, concern over 
the anchoring around the caps may be misguided.  Indeed, forcing 
attorneys to keep their demands in line with what caps permit would 
create far more consistency in the anchoring that already occurs within 
jury deliberation.108
Despite the empirical work on the effects of disclosed damage 
caps on jury awards, it is difficult to predict what actual effects would 
occur in the § 1981a context in the absence of empirical data regarding 
the average size of a damage demand for federal employment 
discrimination cases or the average size of damage awards.  It is not even 
clear what size employer is most often sued, meaning that the actual 
monetary level of the cap that would be applied in most cases is not 
104
 One might imagine that an easy solution would be to tell juries that they should 
deliberate about damages as though there were no caps, but tell them about the caps to 
increase their efficiency.  Thus they would eliminate any debate about choosing 
between damage awards higher than the cap, but they would still deliberate “normally” 
about damage awards they might be considering that fell below the cap.  However, 
numerous empirical studies have suggested that there is no way to offset such effects by 
expressly telling people to disregard certain information that they have already been 
given in making their decisions..  See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental 
Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgment and 
Evaluation. 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994). 
105 See EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES:  THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 152-54 (2003).  
106
 Studies have shown that defendant’s counter-suggestion of a damage award also 
has a potent affect on the jury’s damages determination.  See Mollie W. Marti &
Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For:  The Effect of Anchors on Personal 
Injury Damages Awards.  6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:  APPLIED 91 (2000).  
107
 Some jurisdictions do not permit plaintiffs or defendants to suggest a particular 
monetary damage figure.  GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note GB1, at 151.
108
 Caps have been shown empirically to have a similar anchoring effect on 
negotiated settlements.  Greg Pogarsky & Linda Babcock, Damage Caps, Motivated 
Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 143 (2001).   
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certain.  For these reasons, the most likely directionality of any 
anchoring effects that disclosure of the caps might produce is not clear.
However, these effects appear more likely to raise awards on the lower 
end of the scale and lower awards on the upper end of the scale.
B. Scaling
In marked contrast to the invariance principle of expected utility 
theory, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that the framing 
of outcomes does have significant effects on individuals' choices.109
Scaling is one type of framing effect with the potential to impact jurors’ 
decision-making in light of the disclosure of a damage cap.  Research 
has shown that the framing of outcomes into differing "response scales," 
or ranges of possible response alternatives, can have a significant effect 
on responses.110  For example, psychologist Norbert Schwarz and his 
colleagues asked individuals to estimate how much television they 
watched per day.111  When individuals were given a scale that went, at 
half-hour intervals, from a low end of one half hour to a high end of 
more than two and a half hours, only 16 percent of respondents said that 
they watched more than two and a half hours of television per day.112
But when individuals were given a scale that ranged from “up to” two 
and a half hours at the low end to more than four and a half hours at the 
high end, 37.5 percent of respondents said that they watched more than 
two and a half hours per day.113  Those using the lower value scale 
estimated the average citizen’s television viewing time at 2.7 hours, 
while those using the higher value scale estimated it at 3.2 hours.114
Essentially, scaling means that the presentation of a number or 
numbers creates a mental scale that individuals use to calibrate choices.
Theorists have suggested that this result stems from people’s 
fundamental need to make conversational sense out of information that 
has been provided to them.  Information is assumed to be provided 
because it is relevant to the task at hand, and is assumed to be no more or 
less than is needed to complete the task.115  Take, for instance, the case 
109 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S251-78 (1986).
110 PLOUS, supra note SP1, at 66-67.  
111 Norbert Schwarz et al., Response Scale: Effects of Category Range on Reported 
Behavior and Comparative Judgments, 49 PUB. OP. Q. 388, 389 (1985).
112 Id. at 390.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 390-91.
115
 Schwarz and others have suggested that these results stem from linguistic 
conventions.  Citing conversational principles developed by Paul Grice, Schwarz 
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of television viewing:  suppose one likes to think that one watches an 
average (or better yet, slightly below average) amount of television, but 
hasn’t really bothered to count the actual time spent watching.  One will 
assume that the response scale provided by the questioner reflects an 
accurate assessment of the range of television viewing habits, from slight 
to heavy.  Thus a responder will choose a point towards the lower end of 
the scale, regardless of what number is at that lower point.  As Schwarz 
shows, one would be less likely to choose the highest number offered, 
because it seems so unlikely that the end point of the scale would 
represent average or below average frequency.    
Jurors presented with the damage cap may experience a scaling 
effect, interpreting the maximum award amount as a measuring stick by 
which to assess conduct.  Making “conversational” sense out of the cap 
might mean that Congress has told the jury that this is the largest amount 
of financial damage that one can sustain from a federal employment 
discrimination violation – and, in turn, if this is the largest amount of 
damage, then it must correspond to the most severe injury.  That is, a 
damage cap is a message from Congress (or the judge) to the jury that 
says that the worst conduct is to be redressed by damages in the amount 
of the cap.  It logically follows that less egregious conduct should be 
remedied by lower sums.  
For example, knowledge that the cap for damages is $300,000 
may prompt jurors to imagine that $100,000 appropriately compensates a 
lesser degree of injury, $200,000 compensates an intermediate degree of 
injury, and $300,000 compensates the highest degree of injury.  Without 
knowledge of the caps, juries may use the plaintiffs' requests for 
damages as the marker of a response scale:  for instance, if plaintiff 
alleges egregious conduct and asks for $10,000,000, a jury may decide 
that the conduct is only moderately severe, and award $5,000,000; that 
same jury faced with a plaintiff asking for $1,000,000 might award 
persuasively argues that research subjects read and process a survey or questionnaire as 
part of a normal conversation between researcher and subject, using Gricean maxims of 
quality, quantity, relation and manner.  Thus research questions and statements will be 
assumed to provide no more or less information than necessary to answer the question; 
similarly, they will be assumed accurate and truthful.  Participants will assume that 
information provided is in some way relevant to the task, and finally, they will assume 
information is provided in a way that is meant to be understood.  See Norbert Schwarz, 
Judgment in a Social Context:  Biases, Shortcomings, and the Logic of Conversation, in 
26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123-162 (Mark Zanna ed., 
1994); see also Denis Hilton, Conversational Processes and Causal Explanation, 107 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 65 (1990); John F. Kihlstrom, Demand Characteristics in the 
Laboratory and the Clinic:  Conversations and Collaborations with Subjects and 
Patients, 5 PREVENTION & TREATMENT article 36c (2002).
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$500,000.  Jurors might, too, disregard plaintiffs' requests as self-
interested and create their own scales for damages using other criteria. 
There is still an open question, as with anchoring, as to the most 
likely directionality of any scaling effects on verdicts.  Take a case 
where the jury believes that the injury is intermediate:  if their award 
without disclosure of the caps would have been $50,000, then scaling 
effects from the disclosure of the caps might raise their award to 
$200,000.  But if the jury would have awarded $1,000,000 for an 
intermediate injury, then scaling would act to lower it, even more than 
the mere cap at $300,000 would do.  The findings of Saks and his 
colleagues116 are, in fact, largely consistent with scaling effects, and 
suggest that scaling effects could increase the damage awards for lower 
injury cases, but further empirical research is needed to assess how 
scaling effects might function.  
C.  Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion
Prospect theory posits that people do not assess utility per se 
when making a decision; rather, they evaluate their options based on the 
resulting gain or loss from a starting reference point.117  Prospect theory 
was expressly developed to explain research findings that showed that 
individuals consistently make decisions that do not conform to principles 
of expected utility theory.118  Prospect theory relies heavily on the 
concept that individuals are deeply affected by how decisions are 
framed.  Losses “loom” larger than gains, and decision-makers will take 
greater risk to avoid a loss than they would to reap a similar gain – that 
is, they are loss averse.119
Without knowledge of a damage cap, a jury is likely to perceive 
any amount that it awards plaintiff as a gain for the plaintiff.120  But in 
light of the existence of a damage cap, jurors may perceive any award 
that is less than the cap as a loss, and would be more averse to awarding 
a number below the cap than they would have otherwise been if ignorant 
of the cap.  Any loss aversion effects due to knowledge of the damage 
116 Saks et al., supra note MS1, at 251-52.
117
 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979), reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES, AND 
FRAMES 17 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120
 Certainly, it is possible that jurors also perceive this as a loss for the defendant, 
but once jurors have decided that liability exists, it seems far more likely that they will 
identify with the plaintiff than defendant and will thus perceive the award, more 
generally, as a gain.
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caps, then, would exert upward pressure on damage awards.     
A related psychological phenomenon, the "endowment effect,"121
similarly suggests that knowledge of the caps will produce higher awards 
than ignorance of the caps.  Under the endowment effect, people value 
more highly the things that they already possess than they would value 
those same things if they had to acquire them ab initio.  Jurors learning 
of the cap may perceive it as consonant with a damages award itself.  
Mentally perceiving the damage limit as a damage award that has 
already been awarded to the plaintiff could result in framing effects that 
code any award under the cap as a loss.  If such jurors identify with the 
plaintiff and perceive a lesser award as "giving up" money, they may act 
to prevent this from happening.  
The status quo bias, another psychological phenomenon based 
largely on the principle of loss aversion, may similarly exert upward 
pressure on the average damage award.  The status quo bias is a 
phenomenon whereby people remain at the status quo because 
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages.122  For this 
reason, jurors may latch on to the cap amount as the status quo and be 
reluctant to award any amount that is lower than the cap.  
Both the endowment effect and the status quo bias seem more 
likely to occur with a damage cap than with a plaintiff’s request for 
damages, because jurors are likely to perceive the damages request as an 
aspiration by plaintiff, in contrast to an endowment or pronouncement by 
the legislature or court.  Theoretically, loss aversion effects are likely to 
increase damage awards in low or moderate-severity cases, where juries 
would otherwise have awarded damages in an amount below the cap, but 
would not have any impact on damage awards for very severe cases, in 
which juries would likely have awarded damages above the cap. This is 
largely consistent with the empirical findings of Saks and his colleagues, 
who found that low-severity cases received higher damages when jurors 
knew of a cap.123
D.  Evasion and Reactance
Knowledge of the existence of caps might simply cause jurors, 
acting rationally, to reapportion their damages award among the different 
claims brought by plaintiff.  For example, assume that jurors arrive at a 
121
 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND 
FRAMES 160-63 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, eds., 2000).   
122 Id. at 163-65.
123 Saks et al., supra note MS1, at 251.
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damages figure that they believe appropriately responds to the particular 
needs of a plaintiff and the behavior of a defendant.  Knowledge of a cap 
that is less than that figure may prompt jurors to be creative in allocating 
damages to various claims, in essence evading the cap in order to 
provide plaintiff with what they believe is the proper amount of 
damages.  
The court in Sasaki believed just such an evasion had taken place 
when the jury awarded $61,250 in damages under the Title VII claim and 
$150,000 in damages under the state tort claim.  Had the jury not known 
about the cap, it might have allocated all of its damages to the sexual 
harassment claim, or at least might have divided the damages 50/50 
between the claims.  Knowledge of the cap allowed the jury to provide a 
larger overall damages award for plaintiff's federal and state claims.  
Thus disclosure of the caps may make a rationally acting jury divide its 
award in a different manner than it otherwise might have done; however, 
the total damage award would not differ from what would have been 
awarded had there been no caps at all.  If juries were able to evade the 
Congressional caps, average total damage awards would be presumably 
be higher.
Might the jurors act not just to evade the restrictions of the caps, 
but as part of a response pattern expressly to those restrictions?  The 
psychological theory of reactance posits that when individuals feel that 
their behavior options have been limited, they react by becoming 
psychologically aroused.124  Possible effects include increased attraction 
to the forbidden option.  Under this theory, juries might not merely 
reallocate damages into another category in order to evade the restriction 
on their behavior; the restriction on their damage-awarding behavior 
might even propel them to find a high monetary award more appealing 
than they would have without knowledge of a cap.125  Reactance effects 
would, then, exert upward pressure on overall damage awards.  
In a process similar to reactance, jurors might experience reactive 
devaluation based on revelation of the caps by the judge or attorneys.  
Reactive devaluation describes the phenomenon in which individuals 
assess the appeal of a choice based on the identity of the entity proposing 
the choice.  If an individual perceives a choice as stemming from an 
124
 Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting 
Instructions:  Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to 
Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL.
& L. 677 (2000) (citing J.W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE
(1966)).  
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 There is also an element of the political to this effect; liberal jurors who feel that 
tort reform as a general matter is bad may react more strongly to the limit on their 
behavior, whereas conservative jurors may not experience any reaction to a cap at all.  
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adversary, the choice is less appealing than the same choice would be 
coming from an ally.126  For example, in the 1980’s, students who heard 
the same proposal about nuclear disarmament rated it more favorably 
when the source was said to be the United States than when the source 
was said to be the Soviet Union.127
In the case of caps, if the jury perceives the court and or Congress 
as limiting its power – and thus as an opposing party to it – the jury may 
reactively devalue a damage cap so that it no longer seems adequate to 
compensate a plaintiff fully for the harm suffered.  That is, the jury will 
perceive that if the court and Congress believe that a cap figure is 
sufficient to compensate plaintiff, then it certainly cannot be adequate to 
compensate plaintiff.  Similar to the process of reactance, the jury may 
then not only award the maximum permitted by the cap, but may be 
spurred on to award more money for any other available claim.  In 
absence of disclosure of the caps, jurors are unlikely to feel themselves 
in opposition to the plaintiff once they have decided on defendant's 
liability, making it far less likely that the figure proposed by a plaintiff 
will produce reactive devaluation.
There is currently no empirical data that supports a reactance or 
reactive devaluation effect in jury damage awards.  A study by Greene et 
al.128 found that damage awards made by mock jurors who were told of a 
cap on punitive damages but were able to award uncapped compensatory 
damages did not differ significantly from damage awards made by mock 
jurors who were able to award unlimited punitive and compensatory 
damages.  An earlier study by Jennifer Robbennolt and Christina 
Studebaker129 yielded similar results.  Although research findings do not 
support a finding of reactance or reactive devaluation by juries in 
response to damage caps, it is not clear that jurors would never have such 
a reaction to any legislative cap in any legal context.  Several important 
differences between the studies that have been performed to date and the 
§ 1981a context include, for example, the § 1981a limit on both punitive 
and compensatory damages, so that in essence all non-equitable130
recovery under federal civil rights law is limited by the caps.  
Additionally, there has not yet been a study that has tested for reactance 
126
 Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in 
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 28 (Kenneth Arrow et al. ed., 1995).
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or reactive devaluation effects in a group “jury” setting rather than 
among individual mock jurors.131
E. Availability
Informing juries of a cap on damages may produce an availability 
effect.  The damage cap number will be more salient, or available to the 
jury, than any other potential damage award.  Availability is a decision-
making heuristic in which decision-makers assess the likelihood of an 
event by how easily a similar event can be brought to mind.132  For 
example, research has shown that individuals believe it is more likely 
that one would be killed by a shark attack than by falling airplane 
parts.133  Certainly, people have heard more about shark attacks than they 
have about deaths due to falling airplane parts.  In truth, however, the 
odds of death from a shark attack are far lower than the odds of death 
from falling airplane parts.  Theorists have explained this result by 
noting that examples of shark attacks are far more mentally available to 
the average person than examples of people being hit by falling pieces of 
an airplane.
In making their determination of damages, jurors could more 
easily bring the cap number to mind than other amounts of damage 
awards.  Of course, if the jury would have found damages in an amount 
over the cap without knowledge of the cap, then availability will not 
affect the ultimate outcome, but if a jury would have awarded fewer 
damages, the availability of the cap number may prompt jurors to arrive 
at a higher damages figure.  In essence, availability suggests that jurors, 
trying to think up a damages award, will be asking themselves, “What 
does a damage award look like?” and will answer, “It looks like [the 
figure provided by the court as a cap].”  Any availability effect of the cap 
may also depend on what other damage award numbers are present in 
jurors’ minds.  For example, jurors may know of damage awards in other 
cases,134 or may be aware of both plaintiff and defendant’s suggestions 
of appropriate damage awards.      
131
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F.  Satisficing
Knowledge of damage caps may affect not just the bottom line 
but also the “quality” of the jury’s damage decision.  Although empirical 
work has indicated that juries do not make decisions according to 
expected utility theory, the justice system is premised on an assumption 
that juries do make an effort to reach good decisions.  However, 
knowledge of a cap may encourage the use of certain heuristics, or 
“shortcuts” to decision-making, that psychologists and other researchers 
have identified as being used by individual decision-makers in real-
world decision-making.  
For instance, the satisficing heuristic describes a decision-making 
process in which a decision-maker sets a minimum value that attributes 
of any alternative must meet.  The decision-maker considers alternatives 
one by one, in whatever order they happen to be presented.  The first 
alternative in which each attribute meets the decision-maker’s minimum 
is selected.  Regardless of how many additional alternatives remain to be 
examined, the decision-maker then stops and does not examine any other 
alternatives.135
In juror deliberations, a damage cap could encourage a jury to 
choose a satisficing heuristic.  The range of damage awards is far 
narrower with a cap; jurors might perceive the cap as the criteria which 
their award must meet.  Thus, as soon as one juror proposed a damages 
award that fell under the cap, jurors would accept that number without 
considering other alternatives.  For example, a juror might propose 
$250,000 in damages; in light of the cap, other jurors would agree to the 
proposal to save time and effort, even though, without knowledge of a 
cap, jurors might have weighed a number of options and arrived at a 
different decision.  There has not been any empirical research to date that 
examines whether juries may use a satisficing process in their 
deliberations.
G. Overall Effects of Disclosure Versus Non-Disclosure
Psychological research, then, makes clear that the juries’ 
135 JOHN W. PAYNE, JAMES R. BETTMAN & ERIC J. JOHNSON, THE ADAPTIVE 
DECISION MAKER 26 (1993).  Suppose, for instance, that one was hunting for an 
apartment of at least 1000 square feet and wanted to pay no more than $2000 per 
month.  Under satisficing, one would take a 1000 square foot apartment for $1900 a 
month as soon as one saw it, never learning that the next apartment on the list to be 
seen was 1200 square feet and $1800 a month.
28 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew Bodie
decision-making processes, as well as ultimate awards, will likely differ 
if jurors are informed of the damage caps.  Both theoretical work and 
empirical research seem to indicate that disclosure of the caps would 
tend to raise average awards in low-severity injury cases, but would tend 
to lower average awards for high-severity injury cases.  However, given 
the complexities involved in assessing severity levels in individual, 
unique cases,136 it is still largely unclear whether the bulk of awards 
would be pressured upward or downward by the disclosure of the caps.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that non-disclosure does act as a buffer, 
preventing the caps from affecting the jury’s damage award decision-
making process.  Thus the caps do act to protect the integrity of the 
jury’s damage award decision-making process.137 Below, however, we 
explore a graver consequence of non-disclosure – a threat to the integrity 
of the jury system as a whole.  
III
THE EFFECTS OF NON-DISCLOSURE ON THE JURY SYSTEM
To date, what little systematic attention that has been paid to the 
non-disclosure of damage caps has focused on the potential effects that 
disclosure versus non-disclosure might have on jury damages 
deliberations and calculations.  Above, we offer a more comprehensive 
examination of these effects, suggesting ways in which several 
psychological principles might exert upward or downward pressure on 
the jurors' ultimate verdicts as well as alter the quality of the decision-
making process itself.  There has, however, been no attention given to 
the (more pernicious) potential effects of non-disclosure of the caps on 
the judicial process itself.  The non-disclosure has the potential to trigger 
a loss of confidence and trust in the jury system, as well as causing 
inefficiencies in the system stemming from effects on attorney and juror 
behavior.  These effects are discussed below.  
A.  The Threat to the Jury as a Procedurally Just System
The jury plays a crucial political role in the United States.  It has 
been argued that average citizens follow the law not because of the threat 
136 For example, unlike an experimental setting, one cannot hold all factors except 
for the degree of injury constant.  The parties, factual setting, and events are all unique 
to each situation, making assessment of severity a difficult matter.
137
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immediate blow to this integrity.
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of punishment but because the law is perceived as legitimate.138  Juries 
are an important element of the legitimacy of the legal system.139
Theorists have also identified another important function of the jury:  the 
socializing function in which the jury both allows regular citizens to 
participate in the legal process as well as educating citizens about that 
process.140  Thus juries play a political role both on a macro and a micro-
level, serving as a crucial element of a legitimate democratic government 
and engaging average citizens in the political system.
Psychological research has identified the principle of procedural 
justice as an important element of individuals’ perceptions and opinions 
of legal systems and structures.  In the 1970s, a growing dissatisfaction 
with the American legal system helped to spawn research into procedural 
justice.141 Thibaut and Walker suggested that a focus on procedural 
justice – in essence, on the fairness of process – might offer a solution to 
problems such as widespread non-compliance with court orders, 
especially in the child custody domain.142  The fundamental premise of 
procedural justice literature is that individuals are not solely motivated 
by the objective quality of the outcome or the subjective fairness of the 
outcome.  Rather, the procedural justice literature suggests that the 
justice process itself is vital to individuals’ experiences – people are 
more satisfied with outcomes, view them as more favorable, and are 
more willing to voluntary comply with third-party decisions, when they 
perceive the process by which the outcomes were achieved as fair.143
Procedural justice effects have been found in a variety of legal 
contexts, including with juries,144 with police,145 with a mediator,146 and 
with other government authorities.147  Theorists have suggested that 
assessments of procedural justice are vital to the acceptance of decisions 
by legal authorities and, indeed, to the continued preservation of 
138 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161 (1990).
139 VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 248 (1986).
140 HANS & VIDMAR, supra note HV1, at 249.
141 JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975).
142 Id.
143 E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE (1988).
144
 Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the 
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145 TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW (2002) 
146 Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW AND HUM. 
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society.148 Procedural justice plays a powerful role in shaping trust in 
authorities and perceptions of legitimacy of authorities.  People comply 
with the law, trust the law, and respect the law due in large measure to 
their perceptions that the law is a system of fair procedures.  Trust and 
reliance in the jury system are important to the continued respect for the 
justice system as a whole, and trust and reliance can be affected by the 
perception that the jury system is a fair one.149  Concealing damage caps 
from the jury has the potential to suggest a procedurally unfair system:  
players as diverse as the plaintiff, defendant, attorneys, jurors, and the 
public at large may experience procedural justice effects from a rule that 
prevents jurors from learning of damage caps.    
1.  Effects on Parties to the Dispute
People take their disputes to the legal system not just to win but 
in order to bring a fair process to bear on the resolution of their case.  
How might the concealment of a damage cap150 affect parties’ 
perceptions that the legal process is fair?  Procedural justice literature 
suggests that the process by which a dispute is resolved has a distinct 
impact on the parties’ satisfaction with the resolution, over and above the 
distributive – that is, typically, the monetary – outcome.  As we have 
discussed in Part II supra, disclosure of the cap would likely have some 
impact on the monetary award made by the jury, but it is not clear 
whether the award would systematically rise or fall due to disclosure –
meaning that it is not clear whether plaintiffs or defendants would 
typically benefit from disclosure of the cap.  But procedural justice 
literature suggests that all parties, even the “winners,” are less satisfied 
with the outcome when it is arrived at through an unfair process.151  For 
this reason, both plaintiffs and defendants may be less satisfied with the 
jury verdict.  
Although both parties may assess the process less favorably if it 
is not procedurally fair, the paradigmatic case in which a procedural 
justice effect is most likely is the case in which a jury awards plaintiff 
damages higher than the cap amount.  Consider, for example, a case 
similar to Passatino, discussed supra Part I, in which an $8,600,000 
punitive damages award was reduced to $300,000 pursuant to the § 
1981a damage caps.  From a psychological perspective, a number of the 
148 TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 99 (1997).
149
 MacCoun & Tyler, supra note MT1, at 335.
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 A discussion of how the cap itself might impact perceptions of the system’s 
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heuristics and biases that we discussed in Part II, supra, come into play 
in how plaintiffs would assess this monetary result.  First, because 
plaintiffs hear the larger verdict first (even if they already know, as is 
likely, of the existence of the caps), they will frame the lower award as a 
loss of the difference, rather than as a gain of the cap amount.  This 
means that the cap “takes away” money that the jury has awarded them 
and to which they may feel entitled.  Similarly, the jury’s verdict acts as 
an anchor when plaintiffs assess what their case is “worth”:  plaintiffs 
can contrast the cap amount with the damages award and are more likely 
to arrive at an unfavorable conclusion about the distributive fairness of 
their outcome.
But aside from the perception that the actual damages award is 
unfair, plaintiffs are also likely to be more upset and angry at the legal 
process when a jury awards them one amount and the judge must enforce 
a law that caps that amount.  Procedurally, this is a very different 
experience than the one plaintiffs would experience if jurors were told up 
front that there was a cap on recovery.  In that case, juries would never 
make such an inflated award in the first place, and plaintiffs would not 
experience any sense of either distributive or procedural unfairness 
stemming from the jury’s actions in light of the cap.  Any sense of 
procedural (or distributive) unfairness would have to stem from 
Congress’s actions in capping the damages, rather than from – as in the 
case of concealment – the legal system that permitted a “true” 
assessment of their damages but only gave them some, possibly small,152
percentage of that award.  
2. Effects on Attorneys
Lawyers, too, may arrive at the conclusion that the system is not 
procedurally fair – and lawyers’ continued respect for legal authorities 
and institutions is an important component of the functioning of the legal 
system as a whole.  In particular, courts have interpreted Title VII’s non-
disclosure requirement to prevent attorneys as well as the court itself 
from informing juries of the caps.  In jurisdictions that permit attorneys 
to request specific amounts of damages, this has the potential to force 
attorneys to engage in a “courthouse charade” in which they must 
explicitly pretend that the caps do not exist.
Although the text of § 1981a(c)(2) simply requires that "the court 
shall not inform the jury of the limitations" imposed by the caps, in both 
152
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Sasaki and EMC plaintiff's counsel, not the court, was accused of 
violating the non-disclosure provision.  Moreover, counsel did not even 
specifically mention the caps; instead, they said that jurors could award 
"up to $50,000" or "a maximum of $300,000."  But the courts held that 
the reference to a limit on damages was a violation of the non-disclosure 
cap.
The reasonable import of these cases, then, is that plaintiff's 
counsel cannot mention any limit on damages.  But could, or should, 
counsel limit its request to the amount of the caps?  What if plaintiff's 
counsel in Sasaki had instead told the jury, "We are asking you to award 
$50,000 on the harassment claim and $150,000 on the tort claim"?  Such 
a pitch has no reference to any limits imposed on damages.  Jurors might 
wonder why plaintiff had structured her request that way, but they would 
not have been "inform[ed]" of the cap.  Although not ruling on this issue, 
the Fourth Circuit noted that "[s]pecifically requesting the cap amount 
without explicitly mentioning the cap would violate the spirit (if not the 
letter) of the law."153
If counsel cannot even tailor their damage requests to comply 
with the law, then § 1981a(c)(2) goes beyond merely placing a restriction 
on what courts and counsel can say.  Instead, the law has effectively co-
opted counsel into affirmatively perpetuating the charade that the caps do 
not exist.  In interpreting the cap non-disclosure clause, the courts seem 
to be calling on counsel to perform a kabuki-style theater, where 
plaintiffs' attorneys ask for some amount of damages in excess of the 
caps while knowing they can get no more than the cap.  This puts 
plaintiffs' attorneys in a quandary as they approach the task of 
determining their damage demand.
Moreover, at least according to the D.C. Circuit, a jury is entitled 
to allocate damages to a state or local law claim, and thus "evade" the 
cap, if the state or local law claim has no restriction on damages.  A 
plaintiff's attorney may conceivably want to discuss this possibility with 
the jury, in order to explain how the jury must structure its award to 
achieve the desired result.  However, since such an explanation would at 
least imply the existence of a cap, under Sasaki and EMC it would be 
impermissible.  Without information about the caps, jurors would not be 
in a position to express their preferences about damages in light of the 
damages restrictions.  Thus, as in Martini, the court would be left to 
reconstruct juror preferences after the fact.
In essence, attorneys are co-opted by statute and case law into 
misleading the jury, as well as setting wildly inappropriate expectations 
153 Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232, 237 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996).
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for their own clients, by suggesting damage amounts that are far in 
excess of what the jury award could ultimately be.  This means that 
lawyers are required to engage in deception and increases their 
perception that they are engaged in an untrustworthy system; this seems 
likely to lower lawyers’ respect for the integrity of the legal process.  
Additionally, plaintiffs’ attorneys may suffer the same effects that 
plaintiffs themselves experience, in that a procedure that allows for the 
jury to pronounce some “value” of a case but only permits recovery of 
some fraction thereof may seem patently unfair, in a way that would not
occur if juries knew of the cap at the outset.154
3.  Effects on Jurors
Jurors’ perceptions of the fairness of the jury system, too, may 
suffer from non-disclosure of the cap.  Imagine yourself as a juror 
considering a Title VII claim.  After hearing testimony about extensive, 
pervasive, and egregious discrimination at a Fortune 500 company, you 
have determined that the defendant is liable for intentional 
discrimination.  The discrimination reached the highest levels of the 
company, and management showed no interest in redressing or 
preventing discrimination in the future.  After determining that the 
company intentionally violated federal law,155 you and the other jurors 
carefully evaluate the evidence to determine the proper level of damages.  
Based on the pain and suffering caused to the plaintiff, the jury awards 
$500,000 in compensatory damages, and levels a $1 million punitive 
award based on the company's systemic misconduct.  However, after 
spending hours to arrive at this damages assessment, you learn that the 
$1.5 million award will be reduced to $300,000 and that, in fact, it would 
be impossible for plaintiff to receive more that $300,000 no matter what 
the award.
While caps themselves may frustrate a jury that feels that the 
injury with which it is confronted merits a greater payout, we posit that it 
is much more damaging to confidence in the jury system to hide the 
existence of those caps.  While little attention has been paid to this 
concern, we believe it is a significant side effect of a non-disclosure 
system.  It may be that jurors would not ever learn about the imposition 
of the cap; however, even if they do not learn about it in the courtroom, 
they could still find out in the courthouse or in the press.156  If jurors 
154
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become aware of the damage cap’s effect on their verdict, their belief in 
the procedural justice of the jury system may be eroded.  
Jurors involved in the process may reach the conclusion that the 
process that they have participated in is not procedurally fair with respect 
to their contribution.  Jury duty is a rare moment in which ordinary 
citizens are bound up with the legal system; research has shown that the 
experience of jury duty typically boosts jurors’ positive attitude toward 
jury service and their confidence in the jury system.157  Concealment of 
the cap has the potential to add a component to jury service that would 
worsen jurors’ attitudes toward jury service and decrease their 
confidence in the system. 
Although the number of citizens who serve as jurors at any one 
time is a small percentage of the whole population, in the aggregate a 
substantial portion of the population will at some point serve on a jury.158
Additionally, jurors communicate their experience on a jury to others so 
that their experiences, negative or positive, have the potential for a ripple 
effect in the community.159  While it is true that an even smaller 
percentage of those who actually do serve on a jury will serve on a jury 
that hears a Title VII or other federal employment discrimination case, 
there are nonetheless a class of citizens who will have direct experience 
with the concealed damage cap.160
Concealing the damage cap could affect involved jurors’ 
assessment of procedural justice in several ways.  In particular, if the 
jury awards an amount higher than the damage caps, the rejection of that 
award can be damaging to the procedural justice assessments of the jury.  
Researchers have suggested that voice is an important antecedent of 
procedural justice assessments.161  When individuals feel that they have 
had the opportunity to express themselves and to be heard, they are more 
likely to feel that the process is a fair one.162  One could conceive of a 
damages award as an expression by the jury of its views with respect to a 
the caps.  See, e.g., GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note GB1, at 178; Robbennolt &
Studebaker, supra note RS1, at 357; Saks et al., supra note MS1, at 245.
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162 LIND & TYLER, supra note LT1, at 101.
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defendant’s behavior.  If the jury is thwarted in expressing itself through 
its damage award, jury members may conclude that the process is not a 
fair one.163 The jury members are likely to feel that their voices have not 
been heard or respected, in a way that is unlikely if they know before 
their deliberations that they are limited in the amount they may award.
Research has also suggested that the degree of control that 
individuals have in any given decision-making process plays an 
important role in whether they feel that the process is fair.164  In the 
context of the jury, jurors’ ultimate control over the damages award is 
not affected by the concealment of the cap, but by the cap itself.  
Nonetheless, concealing the cap changes the jury’s expectations of its 
own role, so that while a jury aware of the cap might feel that it had full 
control over the damages award within the confines of the cap, a jury 
that did not know of the cap would feel that it had no control if it 
awarded damages in an amount that was summarily rejected due to the 
imposition of the cap.  
4. Systemic Effects
Regardless of the individual experiences of people directly 
involved in a particular case, the structural design of a system in which 
jurors are purposely misled and their views are discarded may have 
important procedural justice effects as well.  Particularly since Title VII 
deals with race and sex discrimination, plaintiffs, jurors, and society at 
large could not be blamed for feeling that the system is "fixed" against 
women and minorities after the cap swoops in from out of nowhere to 
rescue defendants.  In light of public perceptions that the justice system 
is systematically biased against racial and ethnic minorities,165 the cap 
non-disclosure clause is only likely to make a bad situation worse.  More 
broadly, an understanding on the part of the general public that jury 
damage awards are being made in a vacuum of information about caps 
could suggest not only that the decision-making process in Title VII 
cases is unfair but that the government does not trust ordinary citizens 
with important information.  This directly undermines the legitimacy of 
the jury system and citizens’ trust in authority.
163 See, e.g., Derek R. Avery & Miguel A. Quiñones, Disentangling the Effects of 
Voice:  The Incremental Roles of Opportunity, Behavior, and Instrumentality in 
Predicting Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 81 (2002). 
164 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note TW1.
165 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on Racial and Gender Bias in 
the Justice System, Final Report 304-65 (2003), available at:
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/supreme/BiasCmte/FinalReport.pdf
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B. The Potential for Flawed Decision-making
Proponents of cap non-disclosure argue that knowledge of the 
caps would taint juror calculations about the damages.  However, juror 
ignorance about the caps also has the potential to distort the jurors’ true 
intentions for appropriate relief.  In cases involving both state and federal 
employment claims, different legal regimes may govern the available 
awards that juries may choose.  If courts are interested in determining 
what jurors feel is appropriate in light of these different regimes, it 
would be easiest simply to explain the different systems and have the 
jurors arrive at the appropriate award.  Disclosure would alleviate the 
need for courts such as Martini166 to reallocate damages in an effort to 
achieve the jury’s intended award. Instead, juries could work within the 
permitted framework to allocate damages according to their conception 
of justice.167
Courts such as the Fourth Circuit in Sasaki168 might object to 
giving the jurors the opportunity to game the system by, for example, 
overallocating damages to the uncapped state law claim.  However, what 
does the concept of “overallocation” mean in this context?  The § 1981a
damage caps do not preempt the ability of states to allow much greater 
damages for the same underlying injury.169  If jurors unsuspectingly 
allocate damages to the capped federal claim rather than the uncapped 
state or local claim, they have essentially been tricked into letting the 
federal cap dictate the scope of relief.  Hiding the effect of the caps, and 
then failing to reallocate damages to the uncapped claims, is 
disrespectful not only of the jury’s decision but also state law.170 The 
best solution is to simply to inform the jury about the relevant damages 
limitations and then let the jurors allocate between claims as they deem 
proper.171
166 Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
167 One district court initially thought the “ideal solution” to the problem of 
awarding punitives against multiple defendants in an Americans with Disabilities Act 
case was to inform jurors about the overall cap and then allow the jury to assess specific 
damages against each defendant within the cap.  Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm’n v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., No. 92-C-7330, 1993 WL 427454, at *11 
n.12 (N.D. Ill. October 21, 1993).  However, the court retracted this plan after learning 
of the non-disclosure provision.  Id.
168 Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996).
169 Befort, supra note SB1, at 440-41.
170 Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 (9th Cir. 
2000).
171 If the state law claim was not contiguous with the Title VII claim but instead 
covered a different kind of offense, the court could strike down the damages if it felt the 
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C.  Inefficiencies of Non-Disclosure
Requiring jurors to be ignorant of the caps imposes inefficiencies 
on the jurors' process for calculating damages.  If jurors who are unaware 
of the cap know that they wish to award damages greater than the cap, 
but are unsure about what size their award should be, they may waste 
considerable time on an essentially moot decision.  For example, 
supposing that jurors has found defendant liable in a Title VII 
harassment case, and are uncertain whether to award $500,000 or $1 
million in punitive damages.  Jurors may waste considerable time and 
effort in making this decision, but the outcome will be an award of 
$300,000 regardless.  
A traditional complaint about jury service is that it has the 
potential to waste citizens’ time:  jury service takes people away from 
their work and other responsibilities and can consist of long periods of 
time spent waiting to be empanelled or questioned by attorneys.172  The 
additional time spent by jurors working out a damages award that, in any 
event, will be struck down to the level of the cap can only exacerbate 
jurors’ perception that the judicial system wastes their time.  This
inefficiency has the potential effect of frustrating the jury system’s 
overall efficiency by providing additional incentives for citizens to evade 
jury service.
Generally, society desires its citizens to be fully aware of the 
law.173  But the cap non-disclosure requirement promotes, indeed, 
mandates, citizen ignorance about the law.  Although most jurors are 
most likely unaware of the damage caps, should jurors who do know 
about the caps be excluded from Title VII juries?  It would seem to 
follow from Sasaki that jurors should not be informed of the caps, even 
by other members of the jury.174  This poses a bit of a paradox:  how 
could the court or attorneys discover which jurors had such knowledge 
and should be excluded without themselves revealing in some way that 
such caps exist?  And, if knowledgeable jurors are thus excluded, the 
pool of potential Title VII jurors becomes tilted towards those jurors who 
are less informed about the law.  
juror were impermissibly shifting Title VII damages to the (less serious) state law 
violation.  The Sasaki case might be one such example.  See Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237 
(stating that the jury “award[ed] a significantly larger amount of damages for the ‘lesser 
included’ state conduct and injury”).
172 See Seidman Diamond, supra note SD1, at 286.
173 Bryan v. U.S., 524 U.S. 184, 194-96 (1998) (noting the “traditional rule that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse”).
174 Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237.
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In a related vein, jurors who have some knowledge of the law 
may be incorrect in their understandings:  for example, a jury member 
might believe that the cap is much lower or higher than it really is, and 
reveal that misinformation to the rest of the jury.175  This could skew the 
jury’s decision-making far more than an explanation by the judge of the 
relevant cap.  For this reason, too, preventing the court from informing 
juries about the caps is problematic.  In the absence of revealing the 
caps, there is no consistency among juries with respect to the information 
they possess about damage awards.          
We do not suggest here that it is never appropriate to prevent 
some individuals from serving, or to conceal some information from the 
jury.  It is undoubtedly true that juries should be as unbiased as possible, 
and jurors are therefore excluded from service for all manner of valid 
reasons.176  Similarly, a host of possible data can be kept from the jury:  
past criminal records and unduly prejudicial material, for example.  In 
any of these cases, one might raise the concern that keeping the jurors in 
ignorance has a detrimental effect on procedural justice assessments.  
However, in each case, concerns about procedural justice must be 
weighed against the countervailing justice concerns that would be raised 
by allowing jurors access to the information.  For example, allowing 
jurors to see particularly grisly photos of a crime scene may taint the 
fairness of the trial a defendant receives; the fairness concerns in 
preventing the jury from seeing the photos outweighs the fairness 
concerns of jurors’ access to information.  Indeed, jurors themselves 
might even agree, ex post, that this information could have prevented 
them from making a fair and accurate, unbiased determination of the 
facts.  Additionally, most of the other information that is kept from juries 
is done so in a fact-finding context.  Here, jurors are asked not to 
determine the facts but to arrive at a damages award – there is no “truth” 
to discover, but rather, a decision to be made by the jury about the worth 
of the case.  There is no compelling countervailing reason for this 
enforced ignorance that outweighs its negative procedural justice effects.
IV
CAP DISCLOSURE AND THE DEBATE ABOUT JUROR DISCRETION
The disclosure or non-disclosure of damage caps is but one star 
in the constellation of controversy over juror discretion in awarding 
damages.  The propensity for juries to award staggering sums in punitive 
175 See Seidman Diamond, supra note SD1, at 290-91 (quoting Judge William 
Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 119-46 (1990)).
176 HANS & VIDMAR, supra note HV1, at 67.
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or compensatory damages has spawned an entire political movement 
under the banner of “tort reform.”177 As jurors level punitive damages 
that reach into the billions,178 legislatures and courts have begun 
developing methods to cabin larger verdicts.  Damage caps are one 
straightforward way for legislatures to rein in juror awards.  And the 
Supreme Court has undertaken scrutiny of punitive damages under the 
Due Process clause.179  All of these developments – both the massive 
awards, as well as the efforts to review or restrain them – have generated 
heated political controversy and a wealth of academic analysis and 
debate.180
We do not seek to enter into this maelstrom in our limited 
discussion here.  However, our perspective on cap disclosure does 
dovetail nicely with a growing consensus in the realm of damages 
assessment: namely, the benefits of providing more information and 
direction to juries in making their damages assessments.
As courts, practitioners, and academics have noted, jurors 
generally get precious little instruction on how to calculate compensatory 
and punitive damages.181 Instructions on compensatory damages may 
simply be a recitation of the different categories of such damages: pain 
and suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress, impairment of quality of 
life, mental anguish, and other “nonpecuniary” losses.182  And punitive 
damages instructions may simply recite the applicable standard for 
177See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Bringing Justice to Judicial 
Hellholes, available at: http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes (discussing courts and 
jurisdictions that can “seemingly pull million or billion dollar verdicts out of a hat”).  
178 See Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective Rewards and Limited Punishment: 
Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma with Class, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1124 
(2004) (noting that since 1987 at least nine punitive damages awards have reached over 
$1 billion).
179 See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW 
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
180 For a sampling of recent commentary, see Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the 
Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, 
Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. 
Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1 (2004); 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and 
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive 
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003).
181 See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 (noting the “imprecise manner in which 
punitive damages systems are administered”); GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note GB1, 
at 18 (finding a “significant consensus that [jury instructions about damages] are neither 
precise enough nor clear enough to be of real assistance to jurors”); John Gibeaut, 
Punitive Precision, ABA Journal, June 2004, at 44 (noting that jurors received “little 
guidance” about punitive damages in a case about bedbugs in a motel room). 
182 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note GB1, at 19.
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awarding them (e.g., “willful and wanton conduct,”), and then note that 
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish.183 Even if an instruction 
also counsels the jury to avoid “passion or prejudice,” such an instruction 
on its own does little to provide structure to the jury’s contemplation. 184
Commentators fear that the unguided discretion provided to juries allows 
jurors’ biases and judgmental deficiencies to take over the damages 
deliberation process.185
There is voluminous debate about the extent to which jury 
damage awards have gone “out of control.”186  However, there is greater
consensus that compensatory and punitive damages are unpredictable 
and variable – namely, that similar injuries do not receive the same 
compensation.187 Studies into this phenomenon have noted the difficulty 
in translating underlying judgments about compensation and punishment 
into actual dollar awards.  In a study of juror decision-making, Sunstein, 
Kahneman and Schkade surveyed jury-eligible citizens about potential 
damages in a personal injury case.188  They found that there was strong 
agreement across demographic groups about the level of outrage and 
punishment to be directed at different factual scenarios.189  However, 
they discovered that the jurors had real difficulty in mapping these 
shared value judgments onto an unbounded scale of dollars.190 As a 
183 Id.
184 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
185 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note GB1, at 19 (citing Thomas M. 
Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodghill, Due Process and Punitive Damages: Providing 
Meaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REV. 329 (1994)).
186 Compare, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“We 
note once again our concern about punitive damages that ‘run wild.’”) with Dennis J. 
Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating 
Groups, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & L. 622, 703 (2001) (“On the whole . . . the typical 
civil jury award is not extremely large . . . and its amount has not changed drastically 
over the years . . . .”).
187 See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and 
Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (2004); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, 
Jr., On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damages Awards, 42 J.L. & 
ECON. 527, 540-45 (1999); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and 
Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 256, 259 (1989) (arguing that tort awards 
for pain and suffering "vary significantly and that neither the specific facts of the case 
nor differing theoretical views on the functions of the awards can explain such 
variation"); Saks et al., supra note MS1, at 244 (noting the problem of “’horizontal 
inequity,’ that is, differing awards for apparently similar injuries”).
188 See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive 
Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2146 
(1998).
189 Id. at 2143.
190 Id. at 2074, 2078; see also Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and 
Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 765 (1995) (discussing how jurors are 
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result, they found “severe unpredictability and highly erratic outcomes” 
when it came to the dollar awards determined by participants.191  The 
study showed that participants were susceptible to influence by available 
anchors, any comparison cases that had been provided, or the limited 
context that had been provided in some cases.192  Jurors were searching 
for some kind of framing device and thus relied too heavily on whatever 
context had been provided by the materials.193
Commentators have begun to coalesce around the notion that 
jurors need more context and structure to their deliberations about 
compensatory and punitive awards.194  Juries need more information, the 
thinking goes, in order to correct place their awards within a predictable 
and fair societal range.  A variety of processes could be implemented in 
order to provide more context.  More specific jury instructions could 
provide juries with more concrete factors or examples to assess when 
making their determination.195 Caps could also provide context: the cap 
tells jurors that the legislature believes damages should rise no further 
than the amount of the cap.  A more refined system of context would be 
a framework of damage scaling or scheduling: the jury would be given a 
series of characteristics about the case to evaluate, or a set of examples 
of other cases to compare to their own.196  The jurors would thus be 
asked to place their assessments within a framework of societally-
acceptable damage awards.  These frameworks could be constructed 
along the lines of the federal sentencing guidelines: jurors would find 
certain facts about the case and then correlate those facts to  the 
guidelines to determine the damages.197 Providing more context to the 
expected to “monetize” pain and suffering even though there is no market for pain and 
suffering and thereby no market price and no real standard to determine the proper 
monetary amount).
191 Id. at 2103.
192 Id. at 2145.
193 Id. at 2106.
194 See, e.g., Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note MS2, at 330; Sunstein, 
Kahneman & Schkade, supra note SKS1, at 2078-79; Gibeaut, supra note JG1, at 46.
195 See Gibeaut, supra note JG1, at 48-49.
196 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note GB1, at 181-83; David Baldus, John C. 
MacQueen & George Woodworth, Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages 
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for 
Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1175-79 (1995); 
Randall R. Bovberg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in 
Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 909 (1989); Saks et al., 
supra note MS1, at 246.
197 See Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note SKS1, at 2122.  Sunstein, 
Kahneman and Schkade also suggest that judges may be better equipped to apply the 
jurors’ finding to a schedule.  Id.
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jury’s findings about pain, outrage, and punishment would enable jurors 
to do their jobs more knowledgably and consistently. 
Disclosure of the damage caps could thus be part of an overall 
contextual framework for jurors in making compensatory and punitive 
awards.  Taking the caps themselves as a given, disclosure of the caps 
would provide jurors with a context for their decisions.  Ideally, 
Congress would give the caps themselves further context for the jurors to 
contemplate.  For example, did Congress intend the caps as the 
maximum that it believed any jury should award?198 If so, jurors could 
be instructed that the purpose of these caps is to establish the maximum 
amount of damages that can be awarded; thus, these damages represent 
the most extreme end of the spectrum.  In this way, the court would 
acknowledge the effect of response scales on the jury and self-
consciously attempt to create such a scale for the jury to utilize.  If this 
scale were combined with instructions detailing the factors that should 
go into determinations for compensatory and punitive damages, jurors 
could be far more reasoned and systematic in their damage awards.199
It is perhaps more likely, however, that Congress did not intend 
$300,000 as the maximum amount of damages that should reasonably be 
awarded in all cases.200  Instead, Congress might have recognized that a 
perfectly rational jury should, in some cases, award more than the cap, 
but might have feared that actual juries would do so far more often than 
would be proper.201  Thus, the cap would be based on Congress's 
determination that juror bias in inflating damages required a cap that cut 
off some higher awards that would be justified.  Alternatively, Congress 
might have created the caps not out of fear of juror inflation, but instead 
as part of a political compromise.  Under this reading of the statute, the 
caps do not reflect an attempt by Congress to counteract juror bias, but 
instead reflect a number that was acceptable to members of Congress.202
Under either of these scenarios, a scale for which $300,000 was the 
198 See Hennessy v. Penril Datcomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“It would seem logical, therefore, that the maximum permissible award [under 
the § 1981a damage caps] . . . should be reserved for egregious cases.”).
199
 One problem with setting up a "scale" in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) is 
that the scale would have to combine both compensatory and punitive damages. 
200 See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The statutory 
limitation [in § 1981a(b)] is not an endpoint of a scale according to which judges might 
recalibrate jury awards.”).
201
 For example, Congress could theoretically have determined that juries should 
award more than $300,000 in 15 percent of cases, but would actually award more than 
$300,000 in 40 percent of cases.
202
 For example, Congress could have determined that it would be reasonable for 
juries to award damages in excess of $300,000 in 25 percent of cases, but enacted the 
cap anyway because the bill would not have passed otherwise.
DAMAGE CAPS 43
"maximum" would not reflect Congressional intent.  Instead, courts 
should inform the jurors of the cap, but also inform jurors of the purpose 
behind the cap.203  If the cap is a response to juror bias, the court should 
inform the jury that Congress has enacted statutory caps in response to a 
consistent tendency of the jury to overestimate the amount of punitive 
and non-economic damages.  A straightforward acknowledgment of this 
tendency could lead jurors to recognize it and be more thoughtful in 
addressing it.  If the caps result from a political compromise, the jury 
could be informed that the statutory maximum is not meant as an 
endpoint on a scale.  By informing a jury that they have a damage cap, 
but that the cap is not reflective of any value judgment about juries by 
Congress, it might deflate any scaling effects that the number may have.  
It could also be that the caps were enacted based primarily on a fear that 
higher awards would potentially cripple employers economically.204  If 
this fear were the driving force behind the caps, jurors should be 
informed of this policy judgment along with the caps.  Informed jurors 
would then be more sensitive to potential economic harm and might 
adjust their verdicts based on this Congressional policy.
Of course, the legislative history does not tell us exactly why 
Congress enacted the current caps.  But Congress could make clear for 
the future, either in a statutory statement of policy or even in proposed 
jury instructions, exactly what policy concerns the caps reflect.  Instead 
of presuming that jurors cannot handle the truth, Congress should use the 
caps as an opportunity to direct the jury towards a proper level of 
damages.  Congress might even conclude that because a more informed 
jury is better able to handle its responsibilities, it could eventually loosen 
the cap.
Proponents of non-disclosure might object that an attempt to 
provide a tighter framework for compensatory and punitive awards 
might impair the "integrity" of the jury's damages determination.205
203
 Seidman Diamond notes that when juries are informed of reasons behind rules, 
they do remarkably better in understanding and following them.  Seidman Diamond, 
supra note SD1, at 291.  Seidman Diamond and Jonathan Casper conducted research in 
which jurors were given instructions about trebling of damages in antitrust price-fixing 
cases.  They found that jurors who were told reasons for the provision gave awards 
nearly identical to the awards that a jury unaware of trebling gave, while jurors who 
were told just about the provision or were given misinformation did alter the award 
given.  Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict 
Consequences:  Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 513 
(1992).
204 See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 221 (“[T]he purpose of the cap is to deter frivolous 
lawsuits and protect employers from financial ruin as a result of unusually large 
awards.”).
205 See Kang, supra note MK1, at 491; 137 Cong. Rec. S15484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 
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While the notion of the "integrity" or "purity" of the jury's verdict is an 
appealing one, it has several flaws.  First, while non-disclosure of the cap 
is meant to respect the integrity of the jury's determination, the cap itself 
is a direct attack on that integrity.  The cap represents a determination 
that the jury cannot be trusted with unfettered discretion to award 
damages.  As one commentator, a proponent of non-disclosure, noted: 
"Statutory caps reflect legislative conclusions that juries are ill-prepared 
to make the inexact estimations inherent in the assessment of 
noneconomic damages."206  It is hypocritical to be touting the importance 
of the jury's unadulterated verdict right before that verdict is chopped 
down to a pre-set statutory limit.
Second, not all information taints a jury's verdict.  Obviously, 
jurors need information in order to determine damages, and the relevance 
or propriety of different types of information to that determination is 
often hotly contested.  The damage caps are arguably irrelevant to a 
determination of the proper level of damages, since damages are 
generally determined based on facts related to the case.  However, the 
caps do represent a Congressional determination about the maximum 
level of damages for which any employer is potentially liable.  
Moreover, the caps themselves reflect a Congressional intent to reduce 
potential liability for small companies, and to provide a gradation based 
on the number of employees.  To this extent, the caps are plainly quite 
relevant, as they reflect Congressional policy choices.  Awareness of 
these choices could be useful to the jury in making its damages 
determination.
V
CONCLUSION
Congress deployed the damage cap non-disclosure provision in 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act with little overt consideration of its 
ramifications.  In their thumbnail analyses of this provision, courts have 
come to widely divergent conclusions about its purpose and effects.  We 
conclude that juror decision-making processes would likely be affected 
by disclosure of the cap: most probably, smaller awards would rise and 
larger awards would fall.  However, a focus solely on these effects 
ignores the larger impact that non-disclosure has on the judicial system 
itself.  In light of research about the importance of procedural justice, we 
argue that concealing the cap has the potential to undermine the integrity 
1991) (noting that no "upward or downward" pressure should be exerted on the juror's 
verdict).
206
 Kang, supra note MK1, at 492.
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and legitimacy of the jury system.
The best answer to the damage cap disclosure dilemma is more 
complete knowledge of the caps and their context by juries.  Namely, 
rather than expressly preventing courts from disclosing the existence of 
the damage caps, Congress should mandate disclosure in the context of 
fuller instructions about damage determinations.  Although jurors are 
indeed likely to be influenced by exposure to the cap, this result stems in 
part from the dearth of any other relevant or guiding information 
provided to jurors about calculating damages.  Disclosure and additional 
contextual background will lead to more rational damage determinations.  
And perhaps more importantly, it will help to protect and promote 
perceptions that our justice system is legitimate, and fair.
